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Abstract: 
China and Russia have devoted significant resources to developing their 
international broadcasting capacity as an instrument of public diplomacy. 
Focusing on CCTV-N (China) and RT (Russia), this paper discusses the strategies 
each has developed to communicate with international audiences and further the 
foreign policy ambitions of policymakers in Beijing and Moscow. It highlights the 
differences between the two stations, namely CCTV-N’s ambition to rectify 
perceived distortions in the global flow of news about China, and RT’s focus on 
reporting events in the US. Hence the case-studies expose the fine-line between 
propaganda and public diplomacy.  
 
 
 
 2 
The success of soft power - ‘the ability to affect others through the co-optive 
means of framing the agenda, persuading, and eliciting positive attraction in 
order to obtain preferred outcomes’ (Nye, 2011: 21) - depends on 
communication via public diplomacy to make sure ideals, values, policies and 
behaviour are attractive to a target population. A term first used in 1965 by 
Edmund Gullion,  public diplomacy refers to ‘the process by which direct 
relations with people in another country are pursued’ by state and non-state 
actors ‘to advance the interests and extend the values of those being 
represented’ (Sharp, 2007: 6). Jowett and O’Donnell (2012: 287) have provided a 
necessarily broad and inclusive definition of this activity: 
 
Public diplomacy […] deals with the influence of public attitudes on the 
formation and execution of foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions 
of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy; the cultivation 
by governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of 
private groups and interests in one country with another; the reporting 
of foreign affairs and its impact on policy; communications between 
those whose job is communication, as diplomats and foreign 
correspondents; and the process of intercultural communications. 
 
 
According to a taxonomy developed by Cull (2008) public diplomacy is defined 
by five key areas of activity: Listening, advocacy, cultural diplomacy, exchange 
diplomacy and international broadcasting. International broadcasting – 
described by Monroe Price (2003: 53) as an ‘elegant term for … the use of 
electronic media by one society to shape the opinion of the people and leaders of 
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another’ – is an instrument of public diplomacy that is just as relevant now as it 
ever was. International broadcasting connects, indeed overlaps with the other 
four areas in Cull’s taxonomy; but it benefits from being structurally separate 
from other public diplomacy activities since its credibility (and therefore its 
success) hinges on providing a professional and trustworthy news service. One 
of the most important challenges facing all international broadcasting stations 
used as part of a national public diplomacy campaign is how to strike a balance 
between practicing, and being seen to practice, professional ‘objective’ 
journalism while simultaneously serving the interests of the state they represent 
(Price, 2003: 51). This is particularly taxing for those international broadcasters 
whose architecture is embedded within the state system (as in China), or for 
those acting on behalf of states involved in serious diplomatic predicaments and 
international crises (as in Russia). The question in such circumstances is how to 
avoid the stigma- the stench - of propaganda, an activity that cannot escape its 
historical pejorative associations. 
 
This paper discusses how international broadcasting works and is organised to 
help China and Russia advance their soft power and their public diplomacy 
ambitions. The field is only just recognising the value of comparison: As Robin 
Brown has noted, research on public diplomacy is ‘dominated by studies of 
single countries but it is clear that similar problems and issues recur. It is clear 
that there are variations in the organization and conceptualization of external 
communication’ (Brown; see also Pamment, 2013). The strongest point of 
similarity is the level of commitment to, and investment in growing their 
international broadcasting capacity (discussed below). Moreover, it is clear that 
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both Russia and China continue to design their outreach around what Pamment 
(2013: 3) calls ‘old public diplomacy’, namely a ‘one way flow of communication.’ 
Hence the case-studies selected for this paper challenge the alleged rise of ‘new’ 
public diplomacy, described as ‘dialogical, collaborative and inclusive’. New 
public diplomacy, says Pamment, ‘represents a break from “broadcasting” 
models and takes advantage of social media to establish two-way engagement 
with the public’ (ibid.). Despite investing time, money and other resources into 
developing a social media presence, the international broadcasting assets of 
neither Russia nor China - both representing different stages and experiences in 
the transition from authoritarian Communist rule - demonstrate any tangible 
evidence of furthering dialogue with their audiences. Hence it is possible to 
argue that, in analysing China and Russia, the conceptual differentiation between 
public diplomacy and propaganda is blurred (Rawnsley, 2013). This is not only 
suggested by the content, style and motivation of broadcasts, but also from their 
organisation and especially the close relationship between international 
broadcasting stations and the state. This brings to the surface the issue of 
credibility, the single most important factor in determining whether or not a 
particular broadcast will be interpreted as propaganda or public diplomacy. For 
Russia, its actions in the Ukraine and descriptions of them as part of an 
‘information’ or ‘media’ war have brought into question the credibility of 
Russia’s international news organisations; while the juxtaposition between how 
China would like to be seen via its international broadcasting capacity and 
popular perceptions of political life in China creates problems for Beijing’s public 
diplomacy ambitions (Rawnsley, 2013). Therefore, in both case-studies it is 
possible to identify a clear ‘credibility gap’.  
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 However, in comparing China and Russia we find compelling differences 
in their public diplomacy strategies and the way they employ international 
broadcasting to further their public diplomacy objectives. The most striking is 
motivation: the Chinese have an abiding faith in the ability of international 
broadcasting to shape the global conversation about China, and an unshakeable 
belief that the Chinese must explain themselves and their behaviour to an 
international audience that allegedly misunderstands them.  Hence public 
diplomacy activities are designed around the principle, ‘To know us is to love us’. 
Liu Yunshan, the Director of the Propaganda Department of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) summarised this conviction by claiming that ‘a more 
powerful communication capability’ means more ‘effective global influence’ 
(Edney, 2012: 95). In other words, the intangibles of public diplomacy can be 
converted via communication and international broadcasting into tangible 
foreign policy benefits. 
 Russia on the other hand has no such confidence in ‘To know us is to love 
us.’ Indeed, Russia’s principal international news station, RT, spends little time 
covering stories and developments inside Russia, with most of its output 
focusing on global, and specifically American-centred stories that are openly 
critical of the US government’s domestic and international behaviour.  The 
American-educated director of Russia Today/RT has said she was surprised that 
in the US ‘a person thinks it’s necessary to explain his or her image, especially if a 
lot of people think he or she did something wrong. Whereas in Russia it’s a 
common thing to hear “ne opravdivatsya” – “Don’t explain.”’ This, she said, was a 
‘bad approach’ and noted that it has taken a long time for Russia to understand 
the need to explain (Dougherty, 2013: 55). However, to date there is little 
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evidence of RT understanding the ‘need to explain.’ The fact that RT’s gaze is not 
on Russia, but rather is fixed on presenting a critical representation of the US 
raises serious doubts about its role in ‘public diplomacy’ and suggests a more 
ideological and propaganda-based approach to international broadcasting. 
Observing RT Stewart Purvis, a former ITN Chief Executive, may be correct to 
observe that ‘It’s the soft power war that’s replaced the cold war’ (quoted in 
Halliday, 2014). 
  
 
The Global Media Landscape  
The global news media environment is no longer dominated by the likes of CNN 
and the BBC; and the suspicion that news, information and entertainment flow in 
one direction – from West to East and South – is rightfully challenged by new 
multi-directional currents that originate from numerous sites around the world. 
Non-western networks, most famously Al-Jazeera broadcasting from Qatar, but 
also including Japan’s NHK, Russia Today (renamed RT), China’s CCTV-N, India’s 
NDTV and Singapore’s Channel News Asia are now available to viewers across 
the globe, often without subscription. Most edifying is that long-established 
stations, such as the BBC and CNN, are now picking up and using news material 
and film footage shot by other news organisations: global coverage of the 
terrorist attack in Nairobi’s Westgate shopping mall in September 2013 
routinely used film obtained from CCTV, while Russia Today was a major source 
of news about the development of Occupy Wall Street long before American 
news networks paid the movement any serious attention. In other words, CCTV 
and RT have made serious progress towards being accepted as legitimate news 
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organisations, and this has involved their adopting the approach and style of 
their competitors: ‘Russia Today began to look and sound like any 24/7 news 
channel: the thumping music before the news flash, the earnest pretty 
newscasters, the jock-like sportscasters’ (O’Sullivan, 2014). Using the formats 
and protocols familiar to global audiences while claiming to present alternative 
perspectives on the news not only reinforces their acceptability, but also helps to 
make viewers comfortable in their presence.   
We should also note that while many western television networks are 
closing their foreign bureaus, and international radio broadcasting, offering 
ever-diminishing numbers of language services, is shifting to the internet, the 
new entrants to the field are investing heavily in expansion. China’s CCTV, for 
example, has regional production centres in America (in Washington DC, opened 
in 2012) and Africa (in Nairobi, opened in January 2012), five central bureaus 
and 63 correspondents stationed overseas. Russia Today was launched in 2005 
and has since been rebranded ‘RT’. Like CCTV, RT has built a strong presence 
with 21 bureaus in 16 countries, including two in the US – in Washington DC and 
New York - and in October 2014 opened a UK-focused channel based in London 
with German and French services to follow. This level of rapid development 
means commercial and editorially independent channels like CNN are now 
competing for audiences with news providers who are structurally tied to the 
information machinery of particular states.  
 
 
 
Origins     
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This rapid expansion demonstrates the level of investment both China and 
Russia have devoted to creating a voice in the over-crowded media space that 
will amplify their public diplomacy agendas. China especially has identified as 
essential the growth and nurturing of its international broadcasting capacity as 
an instrument of soft power; and as Ramo (2007: 9) notes, this has both an 
international and domestic dimension, since China’s image is a strategically 
important component of the country’s continued modernisation: ‘How China is 
perceived by other nations – and the underlying reality that perception reflects – 
will determine the future of Chinese development and reform’. These sentiments 
were echoed by Liu Yunshan, Director of the Propaganda Department of the CCP, 
who also identified the connection between China’s growing eminence and what 
we might call ‘soft power’: ‘Nowadays,’ he said, ‘nations which have more 
advanced skills and better capability in communications will be more influential 
in the world and can spread their values further’ (quoted in Scotten and 
Hatchten, 2010: 113; Edney, 2012: 905). In a report published in 2011 Zhang 
Lisheng, CCTV’s director of research and development, was very clear about the 
task ahead: ‘CCTV,’ he said, ‘is not high status among international media. World-
class media is [sic] evaluated by four indicators: international influence, ability to 
run operations, ability to scale, and new media influence. CCTV is only beginning 
to influence international opinion, and it cannot yet set the international 
agenda’.1 Zhang’s use of the term ‘influence’ here is very revealing as it confirms 
faith in international broadcasting’s capacity to play an important role in China’s 
public diplomacy activities and in changing the global conversation about the 
country. 
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The development of China’s public diplomacy strategy, with international 
broadcasting as a key component, has reflected particular moments in the 
nation’s modern history, meaning it is difficult to separate the media from the 
political sphere. The connection between the two has been and remains 
indelible. CCTV’s predecessor was Beijing Television which launched in 1958, 
and was from the outset intended as a tool of party propaganda. Beijing 
Television was renamed CCTV in 1978, just as the post-Mao reform era was 
getting into its stride.  
 Coverage by the foreign media of the events in Beijing’s Tiananmen 
Square in 1989 demonstrated for the Chinese leadership the power of 
international public opinion in the new media age and the urgent need to 
challenge dominant narratives about China. While the authorities launched what 
the then Head of the BBC’s Chinese Service, Elizabeth Wright, described as ‘one 
of the most complete disinformation campaigns in the history of the Chinese 
Communist Party’ (Walker, 1992: 140), they were also sensitive to the need for a 
new approach to international communications and the organization of China’s 
official communications machinery. In 1990, when the communications 
technologies had advanced sufficiently to allow the Chinese to consider an 
overseas television service, CCTV began to broadcast beyond China’s borders. 
CCTV opened a channel targeting audiences in East Asia, specifically Taiwan and 
the overseas Chinese. This was politically motivated: Taiwan is still considered a 
province of China and has been the recipient of Communist Party-inspired 
propaganda since the Republic of China retreated to the island in the late 1940s 
(Rawnsley, 2000); while the overseas Chinese are considered a crucial 
constituency in the motherland’s continued development. In 1992, this service 
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became the basis for CCTV-4, China’s first dedicated international channel for 
overseas audiences but broadcasting in Chinese.  
 More importantly for the evolution of China’s public diplomacy, the 
leadership promoted the head of the propaganda apparatus to the Standing 
Committee of the Politburo, the Party’s highest decision-making body, and 
created in 1991 the State Council Information Office (SCIO) to develop and lead 
China’s international communications strategy (Brady, 2008; Edney, 2012: 905). 
With communications now right at the heart of China’s policy-making machinery 
(an achievement matched by few states) broadcasters were instructed to be 
more pro-active in their conduct of public diplomacy on behalf of the nation and 
its international interests. 
 In September 2000 a new channel, CCTV-9, began broadcasting solely in 
English across China, but two years later was available in the US as part of a deal 
made with Rupert Murdoch in exchange for News Corporation’s access to the 
China market. CCTV-9 became CCTV International in 2000, and was again 
rebranded in 2010 as CCTV News or CCTV-N. This final change, along with the 
introduction of on-air foreign anchors and presenters, reflected the station’s 
ambition to be seen as a serious 24-hour news channel working to high 
standards of professional journalism, and to suggest to global audiences that 
CCTV was no longer simply the international propaganda mouthpiece for the 
Chinese government. This follows the renaming in English (and only in English) 
in 2004 of the Propaganda Department (xuanchuanbu) to Publicity Department 
(Brady, 2008). The Chinese terminology, incorporating the word ‘propaganda’ 
has not been altered, and its practice continues much as before.  However, the 
change of name in English is important: It demonstrates China’s growing 
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sensitivity to the way international audiences perceive its communication 
strategies and suggests awareness of the power of labels to influence whether 
and how communications are received and accepted. In the quest to live up to 
the mantra ‘To know us is to love us,’ the terms publicity and public diplomacy 
carry far fewer pejorative connotations than the more politically-loaded 
descriptor ‘propaganda’. 
 By 2008, public diplomacy was receiving serious attention at the highest 
levels of the Chinese government, thanks in part to their embrace of the ‘soft 
power.’ President Jiang Zemin called on China ‘to establish a publicity capacity to 
exert an influence on world opinion that is as strong as China’s international 
standing’ (quoted in Kurlantzick, 2007: 39) and described CCTV as ‘an important 
window through which China knows about the world and the world knows about 
China’ (China View, 2008). Just one year later the government invested an 
estimated US$4 billion in expanding CCTV and the official Xinhua News Agency; 
Radio China International (RCI), broadcasting on both short- and medium-wave 
frequencies launched an internet service; CCTV increased its own foreign 
language provision, now broadcasting in English, French, Spanish, Russian and 
Arabic, and has dedicated services for Africa and North America; and in 2010 
Xinhua unveiled its own English-language television channel, China News 
Network News Corporation (CNC). All of these channels are of course available 
to audiences around the world via the internet, while the People’s Daily, China 
Daily and Global Times all have a strong web presence too, including Twitter 
feeds (CCTV-America is particularly active on Twitter). Again this convergence of 
communications technologies reveals an understanding of how public diplomacy 
in the modern media age must be selective about the platforms used to reach 
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different audiences; and there is irony in the government’s adoption of western-
based social media for international consumers because the Chinese living 
within the borders of the PRC are prevented from accessing Twitter (as well as 
Facebook, Google and YouTube). This has clear public diplomacy implications, 
for as Bishop (2010) has asked, ‘Can China really win hearts and minds when it is 
known as a country that blocks Facebook, Google, YouTube and Twitter?’ In 
2008, China Daily launched a US edition, followed by editions tailored for the 
Korean market (in 2010) and Africa (2012). Also in 2012 Xinhua revealed 
China’s digital interactive e-magazine in Arabic, China Panorama. 
 Further, we should note that China’s media have developed strong 
connections with other media groups across the world: By June 2010 CCTV co-
operated with 279 organisations, and had developed 373 projects for broadcast 
by foreign media. Chinese media have also offered free content to local news 
organisations and have participated in the training of journalists, especially in 
Africa which is a major site of Chinese public diplomacy and economic 
investment: 
 
More than 200 African government officers received Chinese training 
between 2004 and 2011 in order to produce what the Communist Party 
propaganda chief, Li Changchun, described as ‘truthful’ coverage of 
development supported by China’s activities. This has been backed by an 
extensive programme of infrastructure development, with everything 
from satellite equipment for Ugandan television, to building work for 
Equatorial Guinea radio (Plaut, 2012). 
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This exhaustive list of activities – in international broadcasting alone – leaves no 
doubt that the authorities in Beijing believe public diplomacy depends on 
making sure Chinese sources remain the primary source of international news 
about China from Chinese perspectives. 
 Russia’s international broadcasting too has experienced similar levels of 
investment. To cover the cost of developing news services in Arabic and Spanish, 
as well as the continued expansion of broadcasts in English and building a strong 
web presence and several language-specific Twitter feeds, RT’s annual budget 
increased ‘tenfold’ – from US$30 million in 2005 to over $US300 million in 2013 
(Bidder, 2013). In 2015, the government’s investment in RT will rise (from 11.87 
roubles in 2014) by 40 per cent to 15.38 billion roubles.  November 2014 
witnessed the launch of Russia’s new multi-media news agency, Sputnik. 
Operating hubs in major cities across the world and producing broadcasting and 
web material in thirty languages, Sputnik is designed to counter the global 
media’s anti-Russian bias; while Russia Beyond the Headlines, sponsored by 
Rossiyskya Gazeta (a Kremlin-funded newspaper) maintains a website and pays 
for inserts into major western newspapers.    
Such levels of resourcing, investment and development are impressive 
when we recall that since April 2014, the BBC World Service is no longer 
protected from internal competition for funds. The station’s privileged position 
which reflected its importance in British public diplomacy and guaranteed 
secure finance from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office has been removed. 
This has meant the complete closure of language services and the shift of some 
(including Mandarin) to internet only provision. It is therefore not surprising 
that some have chosen to view these developments as a new dynamic in the 
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competition for power between east and west. For example, John Whittingdale, 
chair of the British House of Commons Culture, Media and Sports Select 
Committee, has commented that ‘We are being outgunned massively by the 
Russians and Chinese … It’s frightening the extent to which we are losing the 
information war’ (quoted in Halliday, 2014). Measured by only the number of 
media platforms developed and the level of investment in international 
broadcasting, China and Russia should be doing much better than their more 
established but less resourced competitors. However, the fact that CCTV and RT 
struggle indicates the existence of deeper problems which reflect the design of 
their operation and the credibility of their organisation. 
 
 
Countering the global conversation 
The idea of a Russian or Chinese perspective in global communication flows is 
absolutely central in explaining the public diplomacy strategy both pursue, and 
in understanding the mechanisms of its delivery through their international 
media. In each society political and intellectual elites have been vocal in 
challenging the alleged ‘cultural imperialism’ that in Russia and China structures 
much of the discourse – official and otherwise – on global communications. This 
idea suggests that there is an ‘uneven pattern of international communication. 
The flow of information is basically one way: from West to East, North to South, 
and developed to developing countries’ (Li Congjun, 2011). While President 
Putin announced to RT’s staff that he expected them to ‘break the monopoly of 
the Anglo-Saxon media’ (Bidder, 2013), China’s SARFT in 2001 decided it was 
important to  
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have Chinese voices heard in any location where major western outlets 
are able to present their audio and visual images, and let our radio, TV 
programs and films have significant international impacts, and 
substantially improve the current unfavourable situation that Western 
media is strong but Chinese media is weak in the international arena 
(Deng and Zhang, 2008: 153). 
 
 
The reason SARFT felt that such instructions were necessary was because 
officials identified an urgent need to counter the alleged distortion and 
demonization of China in western media reports. Zhao Qizheng, the former 
director of the SCIO and China’s leading proponent of public diplomacy, has 
claimed that few western news organisations cover China in what he has labelled 
the ‘correct way’ (though he fails to specify what the ‘correct way’ might look 
like). According to Zhao, this means ‘the image of China in world public opinion 
is seriously inconsistent with the actual situation in China. All these background 
conditions magnify the urgency and importance of … China’s public diplomacy’ 
(Zhao, 2012: 15). In short, Zhao expects China to ‘present an accurate picture of 
itself to the world’. Now China is determined to ‘resist the image and values 
imposed on it by the West and assert its own discourse rights’ (Glasser and 
Murphy, 2009: 14).  
The Kremlin likewise is concerned with the way Russia is portrayed in 
western media. In 2001, Sergei Yastrzhembsky, aide to President Putin, noted 
that ‘Russia’s outward image is … gloomier and uniformly darker compared with 
reality’ (quoted in Avgerinos, 2009: 121). In July 2012, President Putin described 
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soft power as ‘all about promoting one’s interests and policies through 
persuasion and creating a positive perception of one’s country, based not just on 
its material achievements but also its spiritual and intellectual heritage’ (Simons, 
2014: 4). However, as noted above RT has chosen a different path that focuses 
more on critical reporting of the US and the American media – exposing the 
credibility gap between what American says and how it behaves - and devotes 
little attention to ‘creating a positive perception’ of Russia, reinforcing suspicions 
that the station is involved in Cold War-style propaganda rather than public 
diplomacy.     
 The Chinese government has gone one stage further beyond correcting 
western understandings of their country, and in addition to voicing concerns 
about cultural imperialism there is also evidence of a critique based on the 
perceived ambitions of western powers towards China. This is judged a more 
deliberate and sinister check on China’s growth in which culture is but one 
aspect. Coverage in the international media of worldwide protests during the 
2008 Olympic torch relay ‘revived long-standing suspicions that US “cultural 
hegemony” was being used to weaken and destabilize China and led to calls for 
Beijing to combat this challenge’ (McGiffert, 2009:14). So in 2012 President Hu 
Jintao made very clear his conviction that ‘international forces are intensifying 
the strategic plot of Westernizing and dividing China,’ and he claimed that 
‘ideological and cultural fields are the focal areas of their long-term infiltration’ 
(Wong, 2012). Here we see how the difference between so-called soft and hard 
power is fragile – perhaps rendering the distinction not only difficult to make but 
also obsolete – and ultimately in the control of audiences: ‘A target may find a 
sender’s promotion of cultural and political values (such as democracy) to be an 
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act of coercion, not persuasion. A sender’s cultural and political values 
themselves may be interpreted by a target state to be the potential source of 
threat to society’ (Lee, 2011: 22). 
 In this framework it is possible to argue that the expansion of China’s 
international broadcasting capacity is driven by an assessment of weakness, and 
that as a consequence public diplomacy is both reactive and defensive; and this 
is understandable given the ‘China threat’ discourse which has prevailed, 
especially in the US, since the 1990s. Even the country’s growth and 
modernisation have been described as a threat, with the so-called ‘China model’ 
of development, itself considered a method of exercising soft power, routinely 
criticised. Mark Leonard (2005) described this model as ‘the biggest ideological 
threat the West has felt since the end of the Cold War.’ 
 The problem for China – and for Russia which likewise feels maligned by 
the western media, especially during the 2014 crisis in Ukraine – is that the way 
they are reported by foreign news organisations is beyond their control: the 
most presentable public diplomacy will not change news agendas. The best that 
RT and CCTV can hope for is to present a credible alternative to western news 
reporting – as RT has done with its coverage of both WikiLeaks and Occupy Wall 
Street - and perhaps influence the global conversation about China and Russia. 
Hence at the launch of CNC in July 2010, its President, Li Congjun, promised the 
station would ‘offer an alternative source of information for a global audience 
and […] promote peace and development by interpreting the world in a global 
perspective’ (CNC, n.d.). 
   
Credibility 
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Yet influencing the global conversation is far from easy. The scope of the 
conversation is not under either Russia or China’s control, but rather resides in 
the audience. There is no guarantee that the audience for international 
programming will decode the meaning of messages in a way the source would 
prefer, since interpretation occurs according to the prevailing cultural, social and 
political beliefs, attitudes and norms among individual audience members. 
 Second, the audience’s image of a country is only partly determined by 
the media they access – western, Chinese or Russian. We must also take into 
account how viewers understand and experience each country: the cognitive 
dissonance (the psychological processing of information which conflicts with 
existing knowledge and values) that may prevent ready acceptance of more 
positive images. The best public diplomacy campaign will find it difficult to 
compete with the reality of human rights abuses, treatment of dissidents, 
domestic problems in governance, behaviour towards Tibet or Ukraine. The 
house arrest of Nobel prize winner Liu Xiaobo by Chinese authorities, or the 
deliberate murder of passengers on Malaysian Airlines Flight MH17 in 2014 will 
immediately undermine the credibility (which is conferred or denied by 
audiences according to how they interpret the actions and behaviour of 
governments) of any public diplomacy campaign; and as Joseph Nye pointed out 
in The Future of Power (2011), in today’s fluid and inclusive information 
environment ‘political struggles occur over the creation and destruction of 
credibility’ (Nye, 2011: 103).             
       It is essential for public diplomacy to align the message with policy, and to 
consider the experience, perceptions and expectations of individual audiences 
tuning into its international broadcasts (in Cull’s taxonomy, successful 
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international broadcasting depends on listening to the audience). In the modern 
media age, alignment is especially important. When communications 
technologies now shatter the boundaries between domestic and international 
domains, and space/time are no longer as relevant as they once were, political 
actors and broadcasters are speaking to multiple audiences simultaneously. This 
means any inconsistences or contradictions in messages across platforms, or 
between messages and events, or even between geographical targets, impact on 
and ultimately damage the source’s credibility. Writing about US public 
diplomacy after 9/11, Nye noted that ‘What appealed at home, failed abroad’ 
(Nye, 2010: 5). For China’s public diplomacy, the formal separation of 
propaganda intended for Chinese audiences at home (duinei xuanchuan) and 
foreign audiences residing in the PRC or elsewhere in the world (duwai 
xuanchuan) is now out of date. What is said in the news on CCTV-1 in Chinese for 
Chinese audiences must be consistent with the programming in English on CCTV-
N and with Twitter feeds for CCTV-America and the People’s Daily; and the 
credibility of the message can be damaged in an instant by film and photos taken 
by witnesses or ‘citizen journalist’ on a mobile telephone, uploaded to the 
internet and distributed around the world in seconds, and even as the recorded 
event is unfolding. This is the reality of conducting public diplomacy in the new 
communications landscape. Mark Twain is credited with saying, ‘A lie can travel 
half way around the world while the truth is putting on its shoes’; one wonders 
what Twain would have made of Twitter. 
 At the time of writing (Autumn/Winter 2014) RT is finding its own 
credibility seriously challenged by events and therefore its value as an 
instrument of Russian public diplomacy undermined. Many commentators and 
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observers, and even some of its own staff, have accused the station of crossing 
the admittedly thin and sometimes arbitrary line between public diplomacy and 
propaganda. Liz Wahl, a former Washington-based correspondent for RT-
America, resigned on air saying: ‘I cannot be part of a network funded by the 
Russian government that whitewashes the actions of Putin … [I] believe in 
disseminating the truth, and that is why, after this newscast, I’m resigning’ 
(Carroll, 2014). Wahl was followed in July by RT’s London correspondent, Sara 
Firth, who announced her resignation on Twitter, revealing what she called a 
‘disrespect for facts’ concerning the downing of Flight MH17. Most worrying for 
RT, in November 2014 its UK offshoot was warned by the British media 
regulator Ofcom that its broadcasts had failed ‘to preserve due partiality’ in 
reporting the crisis in Ukraine.  If ‘To know us is to love us,’ then for Russia that 
‘quest …is proving to be difficult in spite of a lot of time, money and effort being 
spent on various programmes’ (Simons, 2014: 48) precisely because of Russia’s 
behaviour. We also need to be mindful that Russia, ‘as yet unable to define its 
own values, takes an “oppositional” approach to soft power, seeking to improve 
Russia’s image by undermining the narrative projected by the United States. To 
accomplish this goal Russia does not need to carry out a full frontal assault on 
Western values; it can simply “relativize” the values promoted by the West’ 
(Dougherty, 2013: 96). By positioning Russia as ‘different from the US’, RT’s 
value – and credibility – in public diplomacy diminishes, and perception of its 
propaganda role grows. This position as an alternative, a more palatable ‘other’ 
contradicts the central tenets of Russia’s earlier public diplomacy strategy: ‘to 
build and project to the world an image of a country where the economy is 
booming and democracy is developing’ (The Washington Post’s Peter Finn, 2008, 
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quoted in Avgerinos, 2009: 121). The earlier more positive message about Russia 
in RT broadcasts is conceding ground to the more negative message about the 
US. 
 Another major challenge to a station’s credibility is its relationship with, 
and location within, the state machinery. Neither CCTV nor RT can escape the 
fact that they have a very strong relationship with their governments in Beijing 
and Moscow. CCTV is actually embedded within the state structure via its 
responsibility to, and management by SARFT, the Communist Party’s Office of 
External Propaganda and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Brady, 2008). Control 
of public diplomacy by the Party-State apparatus is clear: ‘While it is often those 
within the foreign affairs community who are the most enthusiastic about 
accessing and improving China’s soft power,’ Edney has observed that ‘ … the 
bulk of the work … is not primarily controlled by the foreign affairs bureaucracy 
but rather by the propaganda authorities’ (Edney, 2012: 902). Over in Moscow 
Margarita Simonyan, Director of RT, told researcher Jill Dougherty that she talks 
‘daily’ with the Kremlin (Dougherty, 2013: 55).  
Certainly China’s international broadcasters have made significant 
progress in their evolution from the old-style and simplistic authoritarian model 
of communication, namely: We speak, you listen; and interviews with members 
of CCTV-N suggest that the station is no longer merely a mouthpiece for 
government propaganda (Brady, 2008; Jirik n.d.). In fact, foreign-language 
broadcasts intended for audiences outside China are often allowed to be more 
critical and liberal in tone and content than their Chinese-language counterparts, 
and CCTV-N enjoys ‘more room to push the boundaries than other stations’ 
(Brady, 2008: 167-8). But there are limits of course: As the Controller of what in 
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2004 was still called CCTV-9 noted, ‘We are taking greater efforts to minimize 
the tone of propaganda, to balance our reports, and to be objective. But we 
definitely won’t be reporting as much negative domestic news as the western 
media’ (Jirik, n.d.). It seems that the creation of a Chinese CNN will have to wait. 
 
Audience: Outputs and Impacts 
As neither RT not CCTV undertake any systematic audience research, it is 
impossible to state with accuracy how many viewers each station attracts. 
Certainly both boast impressive audience numbers: CCTV claims to cover ’98 
percent of the world … with 45 million subscribers outside China’ (Zhang, 2011: 
63), while RT asserts a regular audience of 700 million, with 1.4 million 
subscribers to its Youtube channel. Research by others lends little credibility to 
such claims. In her study of CCTV-9 Zhang (2011: 63) has noted that ‘a three-
year internet survey showed that 39 percent of the viewers were non-Chinese 
outside China, 3 percent were non-Chinese in China, and 58 percent were 
Chinese, with the majority (43 percent) of them from within China’ (emphasis 
added). 
Meanwhile, the British-based Broadcasting Audience Research Board 
(BARB) has measured RT’s audience in the UK and found that between 27 
October and 2 November 2014, 395,000 people viewers watched the channel, 
amounting to only 0.7 percent of the potential weekly audience: ‘Some 108,000 
people watched the channel on average each day, meaning it has marginally 
fewer viewers than S4C, the state-funded Welsh-language broadcaster …’ (Smith, 
2014). 
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 CCTV and RT are therefore referring in their advertising to potential 
audience size; to viewers who may be able to watch the channels provided they 
subscribe to or have access to satellite/cable packages that include them. There 
is no reliable data to support claims of either 45 million or 700 million. This 
indicates that China and Russia, like most public diplomacy agents around the 
world, obsess about the outputs rather than the impacts of their soft power 
strategies, which is understandable given that outputs are quantifiable and are 
attractive to bureaucratic machineries fighting for resources and looking for 
immediate returns on investment. However, outputs such as viewing figures tell 
us nothing about how audiences respond to the programmes they watch, nor if 
their attitudes or behaviour towards the source have changed as a consequence 
of engaging with its international broadcasting. 
Polling data suggests that there is no correlation between expenditure on 
soft power activities, including international broadcasting, and positive changes 
in attitudes towards China. In fact, the polls reveal a reversal of fortune despite 
the huge investment in public diplomacy, and one can argue that this is due to 
negative perceptions of China’s policy and behaviour, especially among China’s 
neighbours.2 Russia’s poll ratings abroad have likewise ‘become increasingly 
unfavourable since 2004’ and ‘Russia’s efforts to strengthen its image as a 
trustworthy and cooperative partner among Western audiences have been, thus 
far, unsuccessful’, notwithstanding the Kremlin’s investment in soft power and 
public diplomacy activities (Avgerinos, 2009: 116). Svetlana Babaeva, working 
for the Russian state news agency, RIA Novosti, admitted to Avgerinos (2009: 
12) that ‘Russian officials are … disappointed with the results’: 
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“I remember very well during Putin’s first term, there was a strong 
desire to explain Russia’s position and attitude. In that period, Russia 
Today was created,” she said. … Yet, since then, the Kremlin has grown 
increasingly frustrated because the West still does not accept, 
understand, or want to understand Russia. According to Babaeva … 
“There is a feeling that we are explaining, but the whole world still hates 
us, so why should we explain?” 
 
Why do they hate us? The Americans asked exactly the same question after 9/11, 
and as they soon discovered to their cost, ‘To know us is to love us’ is doomed for 
failure if the message and the reality perceived/experienced by audiences 
consuming the public diplomacy campaign are out of alignment. Credibility is 
everything, and in public diplomacy actions will always speak louder than words. 
In this context, Hongying Wang (2011: 52) has acknowledged ‘the difficulty of 
effective image projection, especially in circumstances in which the targeted 
audience already views the image-projecting country poorly.’ Public diplomacy 
faces an uphill struggle. 
 
Conclusions       
 
The expansion of international broadcasting as a tool of public diplomacy by 
both the Russian and Chinese governments reflects an unshakeable confidence in 
the power of media and communications to surmount and possibly change the 
attitudes of audiences: that greater exposure to news, information and culture 
will reap tangible benefits. There is an urgent need to help shape and manage 
global conversations about both nations, and to remedy alleged defects in the 
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way western media understand Russia and China. ‘To know us is to love us,’ a 
common soft power maxim, is clearly guiding China’s public diplomacy strategy 
which is confident that the size of the campaign, the number of platforms and the 
number of viewers are a marker of success. However, more communication does 
not necessarily mean better or more readily accepted communication. As polling 
data suggests, Russia and China are both struggling to convert the intangibility of 
public diplomacy into tangible changes in international opinion.  
 Both the Chinese and Russian governments consider their impressive 
levels of investment in international broadcasting a necessary and valuable 
corrective to a distorted flow of global communications that privilege western 
media over those from the east or south. In public diplomacy terms this extends 
beyond simply having a voice: it structures perceptions about influence, for at the 
heart of cultural imperialism lies a belief that command over the direction of 
news, information and culture is a reflection of economic power and translates 
into strategic and political power. But both China and Russia do have access to 
the international broadcasting landscape. The challenge now is to convert that 
access into credibility and trust in the long term, and this depends more on their 
political behaviour at home and abroad, and less on disseminating a particularly 
positive message that may or may not be acted upon.      
 
While no actor could sustain a foreign policy driven entirely by the 
whims of its target audience, the actor would do well to identify the 
point where foreign opinion and its own policy part company and work 
hard to close the gap or explain the divergence (Cull, 2008a: 47). 
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The case-studies presented in this paper remind us to be careful in constructing 
a strict dichotomy between propaganda and public diplomacy. Indeed, if we 
accept that the ‘power’ in soft power ultimately resides with the audience who 
choose first whether to watch a particular television station, and second whether 
to accept and act upon the message broadcast, then the semantic difference 
between the two communication activities likewise lies with the consumers: One 
man’s public diplomacy may well be another man’s propaganda. Whether we 
view such activity as propaganda or public diplomacy, there is no doubt that 
renewed competition for access to the global media space is transforming how 
producers, audiences and governments interact. This is seen most clearly in the 
way RT and CCTV-N have adopted familiar news formats, conventions and 
protocols that help attract audiences and make them feel comfortable. While 
wishing to present an alternative to CNN, Al-Jazeera and the BBC, RT and CCTV-N 
have appropriated their characteristics, even employing foreign reporters, 
anchors and commentators to reinforce their respectability and legitimacy.  At 
the same time, while CCTV aims to correct what the Chinese government sees as 
the prevailing distorted picture of China, RT downplays the positive projection of 
Russia to focus more on a new information Cold War with the United States. 
Russian public diplomacy via the media is left to multi-media platforms such as 
Sputnik and Russia Beyond the Headlines, while RT, CCTV, China’s Global Times, 
Xinhua and People’s Daily are particularly energetic on Twitter. Most public 
diplomacy activity is now located away from traditional media and is embedded 
in the sphere of social media where the number of followers, re-Tweets and 
‘Likes’ provides an easy-to-measure indicator of audience size; and where, by 
reading the postings of followers and ‘friends’, it is possible to begin to gauge the 
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impact of messages and reports. In this way public diplomacy is now 
characterised by the convergence of platforms where ‘old’ and ‘new’ media work 
together and complement each other, and require us to expand both the 
definition and our understanding of ‘international broadcasting’.    
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Notes: 
 
1 ‘CCTV research director Zhang Lisheng: Innovation and development, building 
a world-class media,’ Sina blog, 8 January 2011, available at 
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http://news.sina.com.cn/m/2011-01-08/145421782330.shtml, accessed 7 
August 2014. 
2 See the following surveys for further details: BBC World Service (March 2005); 
Brown and Wu (22 May 2009); Pew Research Center (2010); BBC World Service 
(March 2011); Pew Research Center (2014). 
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